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[32 C.2d 559; 197 P.2d 10]

[L. A. No. 20063. In Bank. Sept. 7, 1948.]

Estate of JOSE MARIA ABILA, Deceased. EMELINA V.
ABILA, Appellant, v. M. V. SPENDRUP, Respondent.
[1] Decedents' !:lRtates-Fami1y Support-Small Estates-Persons
Entitled.-An estate of less than $2,500 may not be set aside
to a widow who, because of her desertion, was not entitled
to the support of her husband at the time of his death.
[2] Divorce-Judgment-InterlocutoryDecree-Effect.-Althuugh
an interlocutory divorce decree does not dissolve the marriage,
it terminates the obligation of support in the absence of a
provision therefor.
[3] Id.-Judgment-Final Judgment-Effect of Subsequent Beeonciliation.-When parties become reconciled after an interlocutory divorce decree and live together as husband and
wife, the right to a final decree is destroyed, and they are
entitled to such rights as arise from the legal relation of
husband and wife. The circumstances of reconciliation must
ahow that the parties intended to reunite as husband and
wife; occasional cohabitation does not alone establish a
reconcilia tion.
['] Id.-Judgment-Final Judgment-Effect of Subsequent Beeonciliation.-'l'he evidence did not establish such a resumption
of marital relations following an interlocutory divorce decree
as to revive the husband's obligation of support, where it
appeared that any cohabitation at the wife's home was merely
occasional, that she did not visit the husband's home, and that
he frequently stated to friends that he was single.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County determining heirship. Newcomb Condee,
Judge. Affirmed.
Jesse Bach Porter for Appellant.
MacDonald, Wallace, Cashin & Arrington and W. W.
Wallaee for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-.Tose Maria Abila died in December, 1943,
leaving a will that was duly admitted to probate. Emelina V.
Abila, who was not mentioned in the will, filed a petition" to

-

[1] See llA Cal.Jur. 552; 21 Am.Jur. 562.
[2] See 9 Ca1.Jur. 759.
McK. Dig. References: £1] DI'I'~'ll"llts' Estates, § 389; [2] Divorce, § 120(7); [3, 4] Di\'ol'e~', ~ ]21 (6).
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det ... rminc heirship under s('ction 1080 of the Probate Code,
alleging thnt she is the widow of d('cedcnt. She also allcged
that the entire estatc was l('ss than $2,500 and prayed that it
be sct aside to her as surviving spouse under section 640 of
the Probate Code.
Petitioner married Paul Ortega in 1897, but this marriage
was subsequently annulled. She married decedent in March,
1910. They separated in September, 1911, and decedent obtained an interlocutory decree of divorce in March, 1913, on
the ground of desertion. The final decree, however, has never
been entered. Petitioner entered into a marriage ceremony
with Gustave Moser in 1915, and lived with him for eleven
years. She obtained an interlocutory decree of divorce from
Moscr in May, 1929, and the final decree was entered a year
thereafter. The trial court found that petitioner was not the
widow of decedent at the time of his death, but was the divorced
wife of Moser, and held that she was not entitled to have
the entire estate set aside to her. Petitioner appeals.
Petitioner contends that the interlocutory decree of divorce
did not dissolve her marriage with decedent, since no final
decree was entered, and that the subsequent marriage with
Moser was therefore void. [1] Even if it is assumed, however, that petitioner is the widow of decedent, it does not
follow that she is entitled to have the entire estate set aside to
her. It is settled that an estate may not be set aside to a widow
who, because of her desertion, was not entitled to the support
of her husband at the time of his death. (Estate 0/ Bose, 158
Cal. 428, 429 (lll P. 258] ; Estate of Miller, 158 Cal. 420,
423 [111 P. 255] ; Estate 0/ Boelon, 201 Cal. 36, 41 [255 P.
800] ; see Estate 0/ Brooks, 28 Cal.2d 748 [171 P.2d 724];
Estate 0/ Fulton, 15 Cal.App.2d 202, 204 [59 P.2d 508].)
The question, therefore, is whether at the time of decedent's
death petitioner was entitled to his support. [2] Although
an interlocutory decree of divorce does not dissolve the marriage (Deyoe v. Superior Court, 140 Cal. 476 [74 P. 28, 98
Am.St.Rep. 73] ; Pereira v. Pereira, 156 Cal. 1, 10 [103 P. 488,
134 Am.St.Rep. 107, 23 L.R.A.N.S. 880]; Estate 0/ Dargie,
162 Cal. 51, 53 (121 P. 320)), it terminates the obligation of
support in the absence of a provision therefor. (London G. <fA. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 181 Cal. 460 [184 P. 864] ;
McClure v. McClure, 4 Ca1.2d 356,359-360 [49 P.2d 584, 100
A.L.R. 12571.) Thl' interlocntory decree, which was granted
to dece(lent in 1913 Oil the ground of petitioner's desertion,
lIIuue 110 pro\'isioll for her support. Petitioner is therefore not
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entitled to hav(' thr entire estate assigned to her unless it can
be established that she bad resumed marit.al relations with
ilecedent so as to revive his obligation of support.
Petitioner introduced ('vidence, including her own testimony, that she had resumed marital relations with decedent
several years after s11e obtained a divorce from Moser. She
and her daughter testified that he had lived with her at her
home on weekends during the five years immediately preceding his d('ath. This evidence, however, was contradicted by the
testimony of two witnesses, in addition to the affidavits of
several neighbors of decedent, which show that decedent had
lived alone for many years preceding his death, and that he
spent his weekends for the most part with friends on a
ranch; there was also testimony that petitioner had never
visited the home of decedent, and that he had frequently
stated to friends that he was single. [3] When parties become reconciled after an interlocutory decree and live together
as husband and wife, the right to a final decree is destroyed
(Olson v. Superior Court, 175 Cal. 250, 252 [165 P. 706,
1 A.L.R. 1589] ; Nelson v. Nelson, 7 Ca1.2d 449 [60 P.2d 982]),
and they are entitled to such rights as arise from the legal
relation of husband and wife. (Estate 0/ Dargie, supra, p. 54;
Rickards v. Noonan, 40 Cal.App.2d 266 [104 P.2d 839].) The
circumstances of reconciliation, however, must show that the
parties intended to reunit(' as husband and wife; occasional
cohabitation does not alone ('stablisb a reconciliation. (Keller
v. Keller, 122 Cal.App. 712, 715 [10 P.2d 541); Ruggles v.
Ba~1ey, 15 Cal.App.2d 555, 556 [59 P.2d 837].) "The problem
is one of whether the parties have become so reconciled as to
have fully resumed relations as man and wife with intention
that they be permanent, obviating the necessity or desire for
termination of marriage and making its continuance a matter
of social propriety and probable success." (Nelson on Divorce
and Annulment [2ded., V. 3], 135.) [4] The evidence does
not establish such a resumption of marital relations in this
case. It cannot be held, therefore, that the obligation of support has been revived.
The judgment is affirmed.
Gibson,

C.~J.,

Shenk, J., Edmonda, J., Carter, J., Schauer,

J., and Spence, J., concurred.
Appellant's petition for a l'ehE'aring was denied September
30, 1948.

